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lengths of punishment in subgame perfect equilibrium-is there any subgame perfect equilibrium of an infinitely repeated
multistage practice consider the following simultaneous-move game that is played twice the players observe the
centipedes revisited two players are playing two consecutive games first they play the centipede game described in
campaigning revisitedtwo political candidates are scheduled to campaign in two states in one in period t 1and in the
online gaming consider a two-stage game between two firms that produce online games in the first stage they play a
augmented competition consider two firms playing a two-stage game with discount factor delta in the first stage they
grim trigger consider the infinitely repeated game with discount factor deltaa for which values of the discount factor
not-so-grim trigger consider the infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma with discount factor deltainstead of using
trust off the equilibrium path recall the trust game depicted in figure we argued that for delta ge 12nbsp the
negative ad campaigns revisitedin which each one of two political parties can choose to buy time on commercial radio
regulating medicationsconsider a firm player 1 that produces a unique drug that is used by a consumer player 2 this
tacit collusion two firms which have zero marginal cost and no fixed cost produce some good each producing qinbspge 0 i
disagreement construct a pair of strategies for the ultimatum game t 1 bargaining game that constitute a nash
holdup consider an ultimatum game t 1 bargaining game in which before player 1 makes his offer to player 2 player 2
asymmetric patience 1 consider a three-period sequential alternating offer bargaining model in which two players have
cournot revisited consider the cournot duopoly model in which two firms 1 and 2 simultaneously choose the quantities
armed conflict consider the following strategic situation two rival armies plan to seize a disputed territory each
grab the dollar each of two players has two possible actions grab the dollar or dont grab the dollar player is payoff
1 second-price auctions show that in a second-price sealed-bid auction bidding your valuation weakly dominates bidding
equilibrium selection consider the extensive-form game in figurea find all the bayesian nash equilibria of this gameb
campaigning two politicians an incumbent player 1 and a potential rival player 2 are running for the local mayoralty
entry again the market for widgets has an incumbent firm the total value of having 100 of the market is 10 which the
seltens horse consider the three-person game described in figure known as seltens horse for the obvious reasona what
separating equilibrium consider the entry game described in exercise is it true that in this game any separating
more limit pricing an incumbent firm player 1 is either a low-cost type theta1 thetal or a high-cost type theta1