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an exchange gameeach of two individuals receives a ticket on which there is an integer from 1 to m indicating the size
an exchange game- each of two individuals receives a ticket on which there is an integer from 1 to m indicating the
adverse selection- firm a the acquirer is considering taking over firm t the target it does not know firm ts value it
cournots duopoly game with imperfect information - consider the game when the inverse demand function is given by pq
weak domination in second-price sealed-bid action- show that for each type vi of each player i in a second-price
asymmetric nash equilibria of second-price sealed-bid common value auctions- show that when alpha gamma 1 for any
swing voters curse whether candidate 1 or candidate 2 is elected depends on the votes of two citizens the economy may
determining strict competitiveness -are either of the two games in figure 1 strictly competitive a if we restrict
max minimizers in bos-for the game bos in given figure find the max minimizer of each player show for each equilibrium
increasing payoffs and eliminating actions in strictly competitive games- let g be a strictly competitive game that has
guessing morra- in the two-player game guessing morra each player simultaneously holds up one or two fingers and also
oneills game- consider the game in figure 1a find a completely mixed nash equilibrium in which each player assigns the
maxminimizers vs nash equilibrium actions-the game in figure 1 has a unique nash equilibrium in which player 1s
mixed strategy equilibrium of game in figure 1-show that the game in figure 1 has no non degenerate mixed strategy
rationalizable actions in guessing morra- find the rationalizable actions of each player in the game guessing
rationalizable actions in a public good game- more difficult but also more interesting show the following results for
dominance solvability-find the set of nash equilibria mixed as well as pure of the game in figure 1 show that the game
dominance solvability in bertrands duopoly game- consider the variant of bertrands duopoly game in exercise in which
evolutionary stability and weak domination-let alowast be an evolutionarily stable actiondoes alowast necessarily
variant of bos- find all the esss in pure and mixed strategies of the gamebargaining- pairs of players bargain over the
nash equilibrium in an asymmetric variant of hawk-dove-let beta be a mixed strategy that assigns positive probability
esss and mixed strategy equilibria- generalize the argument that no ess in the game in figure 1 assigns positive
variant of bos- members of a population are randomly matched and play the game bos each player in any given match can
a coordination game between siblings-consider the game in figurefor what values of x gt 1 is x the unique
strategies in the infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma- represent each of the following strategies s in an infinitely