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Check whether there are other Nash equilibria in addition to those found by backward induction.
Show that the game has no value. (Each 0 here represents a matrix of the proper dimensions, such that all of its entries are 0.)
Show whether or not the value exists in each of the following games. If the value exists, find it and find all the optimal strategies for each player.
In a two-player zero-sum game on the unit square where Player I’s strategy set is X = [0, 1] and Player II’s strategy.
Consider a two-player non-zero-sum game on the unit square in which Player I’s strategy set is X = [0, 1].
Fifty people are playing the following game. Each player writes down, on a separate slip of paper, one integer in the set {0, 1,..., 100}, alongside his name.
Peter, Andrew, and James are playing the following game in which the winner is awarded M dollars.
Partnership Game Lee (Player 1), and Julie (Player 2), are business partners. Each of the partners has to determine the amount of effort.
Braess Paradox There are two main roads connecting San Francisco and San Jose, a northern road via Mountain View and a southern road via Cupertino.
The Davis Removal Company and its main rival, Roland Ltd, have fleets of ten trucks each, which leave the companies’ headquarters.
Location games Two competing coffee house chains, Pete’s Coffee and Caribou Coffee, are seeking locations for new branch stores in Cambridge.
Determine whether or not it can represent a strategic-form game corresponding to an extensive-form game with perfect information.
Let G be a game in extensive form. The agent-form game derived from G is a strategic-form game where each player i in G is split into several players.
Find a game that has at least one equilibrium, but in which iterative elimination of dominated strategies yields a game with no equilibria.
Show that in every strategy vector in which there is a player using a strictly dominated strategy, that player can deviate and increase his payoff.
Find a strategy of buyer i that weakly dominates strategy ßi^. Does the strategy under which each buyer bids his private value weakly dominate.
Find the equilibria of the following three-player game (Player I chooses row T , C, or B, Player II a column L, M, or R, and Player III chooses matrix P or Q).
A two-player game is symmetric if the two players have the same strategy set S1 = S2 and the payoff functions satisfy u1(s1, s2) = u2(s2, s1) for each s1, s2.
Find an example of a game G = (N , (Si)i?N , (ui)i?N ) in strategic form such that the game G^ derived from G by elimination of one strategy in one player’s.
Find an example of a strategic form game G and of an equilibrium s* of that game such that for each player i ? N the strategy si is dominated.
William and Henry are participants in a televised game show, seated in separate booths with no possibility of communicating with each other.
Describe as a game in extensive form the version of this game in which Player II knows both the result of the chance move and the action chosen by Player I.
In the game of Hex the two players eliminate (weakly) dominated strategies. What remains of the game once the elimination process ends?
Establish whether there exists a two-player game in extensive form with perfect information, and possible outcomes I (Player I wins).