Questions.
1. What is the maximum amount it would be worth to shareholders to elicit high EO effort all of the time rather than low CEO effort all of the time?
2.If you decide to pay 1 percent of this amount (in Question 1) as a cash bonus, what performance level (what share price or shareholder value) in the table should trigger the bonus? Suppose you decide to elicit high CEO effort when, and if, medium luck occurs by paying a bonus should the company's value rise to $800,000,000. What criticism can you see of this incentive contract plan?
3. Suppose you decide to elicit high CEO effort when, and if, good luck occurs by paying a bonus only for an increase in the company's value to $1,000,000,000.
What criticism can you see of this incentive contract plan?
6. Design a stock option-based incentive plan to elicit high effort. Show that 1 million stock options at a $70 exercise price improves shareholder value relative to the best of the cash bonus plans in Questions 2, 3, or 4.
4. Suppose you decide to elicit high CEO effort when, and if, bad luck occurs by paying the bonus when the company's value falls to $500,000. What criticism can you see of this incentive contract plan?
Questions.
1. Make a list of some of the issues that will need to be resolved if American Airlines decides to routinely charge different prices to customers in the same class of service.
2. Would you expect these revenue management techniques of charging differential prices based on the target customers' willingness to pay for change order responsiveness, delivery reliability, schedule frequency, and so forth to be more effective in the trucking industry, the outpatient health care industry, or the hotel industry? Why or why not?
3. Sometimes when reservation requests by deep discount travelers are refused, demanders take their business elsewhere; they "balk." At other times, such demanders negotiate and can be "sold up" to higher fare service like United's Economy Plus. If United experiences fewer customers balking when reservation requests for the cheapest seats are refused, should they allocate preexisting capacity to protect fewer seats (or more) for late-arriving full-fare passengers?