Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 600 - 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior.
Instruction: Do not round intermediate calculations. Round final answers to 2 decimal places for Cournot values.
Cournot output for each firm:
Cournot profits for each firm: $
Stackelberg leader output:
Stackelberg follower output:
Stackelberg leader profits: $
Stackelberg follower profits: $
Bertrand market-level output:
Bertrand profits for each firm: $
Collusive market-level output:
Collusive industry-level profits: $