Solutions to this Conflict
In common, to make sure that managers act to the best interest of shareholders, the firm will:
(a) Acquire Agency Costs in the form of:
- Monitoring expenditures like audit fee;
- Expenditures to structure the organization therefore the possibility of undesirable management behaviour would be restricted.
- Opportunity cost related with loss of profitable opportunities resultant from structure not permits manager to take action on a timely basis as would be the situation when manager were also owners. This is the cost of delaying choice.
(b) The Shareholder might offer the management profit-based remuneration. This remuneration comprises:
- An offer of shares therefore managers become owners.
- Share options: (Option to purchase shares at a fixed price at future date).
- Profit-based salaries example, bonus
(c) Threat of firing:
Shareholders have the power to assign and dismiss managers that is exercised at every Annual General Meeting (AGM). The threat of firing hence motivates managers to make good judgments.
(d) Threat of Acquisition or Takeover:
When managers do not make good decisions then the value of the company would reduce making it easier to be obtained especially when the predator (acquiring) company beliefs that the firm can be twisted round.