Qusetion: CHRISTY BRZONKALA v. ANTONIO J. MORRISON ET AL. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
FACTS: Petitioner Christy Brzonkala and respondents Antonio Morrison and James Crawford were students at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech). Brzonkala met the respondents at a campus party, where they allegedly assaulted and raped her; according to Brzonkala, Morrison subsequently made boasting, debasing, and vulgar remarks on campus about what he would do to women. Brzonkala claimed to be emotionally disturbed and depressed as a result. She was treated by a university psychiatrist, and soon after the rape she withdrew from the university. Brzonkala fi led a complaint against the respondents under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. Morrison was initially found guilty and suspended for two semesters, but his punishment was ultimately set aside. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in federal court, alleging, among other claims, that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated the Violence against Women Act. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss this complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a claim and that the act's (§ 13981) civil remedy was unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the complaint on grounds that Congress lacked authority to enact the section. The U.S. court of appeals affi rmed the district court's conclusion.
ISSUE: Did Congress have the power under the commerce clause to enact the Violence against Women Act?
REASONING: Congress can regulate three broad categories of activities under its commerce powers. It can regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. It can regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. It can regulate those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The act is properly analyzed as a potential regulation of an activity that substantially affects commerce. The most relevant precedent is Lopez, in which the Supreme Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal crime to knowingly possess a fi rearm in a school zone, exceeded Congress's authority under the commerce clause. That statute was struck down because, fi rst, by its terms it was unrelated to commerce, and whenever the courts have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based on the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor. Second, the statute had no express jurisdictional element to limit its reach to a discrete set of fi rearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.
Third, Congress had no fi ndings about the effect of gun possession at school on interstate commerce. Fourth, the link between gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was attenuated. To uphold the law would have meant that there were no limits on what Congress could regulate. Likewise, gender-motivated crimes of violence are not economic activity, and there was no jurisdictional element showing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. There were some statistics showing the impact of genderrelated crime on victims and their families, but the Court had to decide whether these statistics demonstrate a substantial impact on interstate commerce, and the Court did not believe they do. The Court found that the congressional fi nding relied on a method of reasoning the Court had already rejected as unworkable if any limit on congressional powers is to be maintained. It is not suffi cient to find that gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce "by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved in interstate commerce; by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products." Allowing such reasoning would give Congress the power to regulate almost any crime.
DECISION AND REMEDY: The Court affi rmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that Congress may not regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct solely on the basis of that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE: The case clearly demonstrates an increasing willingness of the Court to limit congressional authority under the commerce clause. Note that the Court is not passing judgment on the quality of the law but is just saying that such a law would need to be passed by the state, not the federal, legislature.
CRITICAL THINKING: This case was a 5-4 decision. What reasoning do you think supported the dissent's opinion?
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING: Recall the WH framework. What values led the majority to rule that Congress lacks authority to enact § 13981 of the Violence against Women Act? Do you think the values you listed are appropriate in this situation in spite of the individuals who are harmed by the decision?