Problem: Kodak & Fuji produce photographic film. Suppose that there are no other significant producers, so that Kodak and Fuji constitute a duopoly (oligopoly). Suppose that the firms can produce 500 or 750 rolls of film for a given market in a given quarter. Assume (1) that firms face the same cost structure; (2) that if both produce 500, then each will profit $16 per day; (3) that if Fuji produces 500 and Kodak 750, then Fuji earns $14 and Kodak earns $21; (4) that if both produce 750 rolls then each will profit $15. The remaining combination is implicit.
Q1. Construct a game matrix for this scenario.
Q2. Is there a Nash Equilibrium for this game? Why or why not.
Q3. Suppose that Fuji & Kodak decide to collude. What level of output would be chosen? Why?