Research Question: How have regime changes in Ghana since independence influenced the country's economic development?
Articles for the literature Review
1. Jeong, Ho-Won. "Economic reform and democratic transition in Ghana." World Affs. 160 (1997): 218.
2. Zeff, Eleanor E. "New directions in understanding military and civilian regimes in Ghana." African Studies Review 24, no. 1 (1981): 49-72.
3. Rothchild, Donald. "Military regime performance: An appraisal of the Ghana experience, 1972-78." Comparative Politics 12, no. 4 (1980): 459-479
4. Ninsin, Kwame A. "Some Problems in Ghana's Transition to Democratic Governance." Africa Development/Afrique et Developpement (1993): 5-22.
5. Fosu, Augustin Kwasi. "Political instability and economic growth: Implications of coup events in Sub-Saharan Africa." American Journal of Economics and Sociology 61, no. 1 (2002): 329-348.
6. Morrison, Minion KC. "Political parties in Ghana through four republics: A path to democratic consolidation." Comparative Politics (2004): 421-442.
7. Debrah, Emmanuel. "The economy and regime change in Ghana, 1992-2004." Ghana Social Science Journal 6, no. 2 (2009): 30-30.
8. Abass, Usman. "DEMOCRACY: A REFLECTION ON GHANA'S REPUBLICS, 1960-1992." Africania 4, no. 1 (2024): 1-23.
9. Durham, J. Benson. "Economic growth and political regimes." Journal of Economic Growth 4 (1999): 81-111.
10. Geddes, Barbara. "What Causes Democratization?" In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, edited by Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, 317-339. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
11. Kitschelt, Herbert. "Party Systems." In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, edited by Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, 522-554. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
12. Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. "Mass Beliefs and Democratic Institutions." In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, edited by Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, 297-316. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Instructions:
Use the articles above to write a comprehensive literature review for the research question above.
Below is a sample of Literature review and that will quide you with regards to what I am expecting for my paper. So look at the sample below and write similar one based on the information provided above.
Introduction:
Democracy is the favored form of government in Western Civilizations. However, despite the desire for increased democracy, only fifty percent of all countries are true democracies (Boix, 2006). This trend shows that not only, is a democratic regime not truly dominant globally, but that other forms of government survive and thrive. In fact, some of these governments last years, for example the Institutional Revolutionary Party held power in Mexico for over 70 years (Magaloni, 2006). Even Hitler and the Nazis held on to power for over a decade.
The question to consider is how have non-democratic governments been able to maintain power and control in an era where Western Democracy is the best solution? The goal of this paper is to outline why authoritarian governments have decided to incorporate democratic institutions. Do these institutions help maintain power or do they just attempt to hide an authoritarian government by promoting specific democratic values?
Literature Review
A democracy is categorized by free and fair elections and a transfer of power through the means power is gained (Cheibub et. al, 2009). Alternatively, authoritarian regimes have been able to maintain power without free and fair elections. If the governments held free and fair elections, where power transferred, the countries would be counted as democracies. Instead these governments are not viewed as democracies, despite an effort to categorize them as such (Levitsky and Way, 2002). The issue with this approach as discussed by Levitsky and Way is that many countries are not attempting to be democracies (Levitsky and Way, 52).
The adoption of democratic principles in authoritarian regimes is not necessarily just about creating the impression of democracy. In fact, it may just be a further method to allow leaders to entrench their parties and create a rewards system (Boix and Svolik, 2013). Allies of the ruling party are less likely to revolt or try to reform the government if they are happy with the current system. Power sharing through institutions limits a challenger's ability to eradicate an authoritarian leader's control over the government (Boix and Svolik, 2013). If leaders can give their allies more power or more rewards then there is less of a threat. Parties and institutions under authoritarian regimes can help maintain the power by overcoming small threats through mobilization (Ezra and Frantz, 2011). The ability to mobilize the masses to lend support to the leader entrenches an authoritarian leader in power. With the masses on their side, there is a lack of real threat to their position. Authoritarian leaders will not have to worry about looking over their shoulders. This lack of fear in turn creates a level of comfort for a leader. Employing democratic institutions leads to a longer tenure as the leader of a country (Boix and Svolik, 2013).
Dictatorships of complete control and oppression have diminished as authoritarian regimes now incorporate political parties, institutions, and other democratic elements into the regime (Ezra and Frantz, 2011). In fact, the adoption of these principles has led to more authoritarian regimes maintaining power (Taylor and Frantz, 2011). The stretch needed to understand the adoption of democratic principles does not seem very complicated. Authoritarian leaders adopt these institutions to seem more transparent and to give the effect of a democracy. The PRI in Mexico held elections, but never ceded power to another party for more than 70 years (Magaloni, 2006). This effective adoption of elections with parties and actual voting creates an image of a democracy even if one doesn't exist. A country like Russia for example in today's world is still considered a democracy, yet Vladimir Putin has been in power for more than a decade. Levitsky and Way argue that authoritarianism can co-exist with democracy if human rights are maintained (Levitsky and Way, 58). This signals that the people are concerned less with the actions of the government and more with the open appearance.
Despite the adoption of democratic principles, there is no doubt that countries under authoritarian regimes are not democracies. The idea that authoritarian regimes are holding elections may not be to come off as democracies. Diamond refers to governments that hold elections without any goal of ceding power as "pseudodemocracies," (Diamond, 2003). However, the flaw in Diamond's argument is the assumption that these governments are attempting to come off as a true democracy. In fact, the reason for holding elections has little to do with wanting to be a democracy and more to do with distributing power, appearance of strength, and legitimization (Morgenbesser, 2014). Diamond's approach presumes that the goal is to appear to be democratic while not being a true democracy. Morgenbesser's argument is that authoritarian regimes have no desire to be democratic.
Further, while the PRI held elections while in power, they never gave up control or felt any threat at all from challengers in an election (Magaloni, 2006). The goal of elections is not to pretend to be a democracy, but rather seems to give the people and the rest of the world a sense of democracy. In contrast, Levitsky and Way argue that the method held by the PRI and Diamond's pseudodemocracies are not attempts at democracy, both are full blown authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 54). These governments are not competing to implement democratic institutions, but using them as a sham to create a cover to implement ful blown autocracy. However, Levitsky and Way argue in their example of "competitive authoritarianism" that leaders will bribe, co-opt, and use other means to exert pressure for cooperative behavior (Levitsky and Way, 53). While this behavior may be different than a government that has nothing to fear, the overall outcome is the same: control of the government.
Levitsky and Way's argument seems flawed in that they look at the means rather than the end. The end is still an authoritarian government that uses democratic institutions to maintain their government, but has no desire to adhere to democratic principles. This version is no more different than Diamond's pseudodemocracy or Magaloni's example of the PRI. All three use these democratic institutions to maintain power by presenting an air of democracy without meaning it.
With the rise of the adoption of democratic institutions and principles in authoritarian regimes, one may ask whether democracy is dying and authoritarianism rising. In a study from 1946-2012, the transition of regimes from dictatorships to dictatorships, democracy to dictatorships, and dictatorships to democracy was studied (Taylor and Frantz, 2011). Since the end of the 1990's both democracy to dictatorship transitions and dictatorship to democracy transitions have declined (Taylor and Frantz, 72). This helps to understand the idea that countries are becoming more entrenched in the type of government that has already been established. If the government is a democracy then it will stay a democracy and vice versa.