A small community has 10 people, each of whom has a wealth of $19,000. Each individual must choose whether to contribute $200 or $0 to the support of public entertainment for their community. The money value of the benefit that a person gets from this public entertainment is .80 times the total amount of money contributed by individuals in the community.
a)This game has a dominant strategy equilibrium in which all 10 citizens contribute $200 to support public entertainment.
b) This game has two Nash equilibria, one in which everybody contributes $200 and one in which nobody contributes $200.
c)This game has a Nash equilibrium in which 5 people contribute $200 and for public entertainment and 5 people contribute nothing.
d)This game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, but has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
e)This game has a dominant strategy equilibrium in which nobody contributes anything for public entertainment.