Consider the following market for used cars. There are many sellers of used cars. Each seller has exactly one used car to sell and is characterized by the quality of the used car he wishes to sell. Let θ ∈ [0, 1] index the quality of a used car and assume that θ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. If a seller of type θ sells his car (of quality θ) for a price of p, his utility is us (p,θ). If he does not sell his car, then his utility is 0. Buyers of used cars receive utility θ − p if they buy a car of quality θ at price p and receive utility 0 if they do not purchase a car. There is asymmetric information regarding the quality of used cars. Sellers know the quality of the car they are selling, but buyers do not know its quality. Assume that there are not enough cars to supply all potential buyers.