Bonnie Cook applied for the position of institutional attendant at the Ladd Center, a state residential facility for retarded persons. She was 5 feet, 2 inches tall and weighed more than 320 pounds. During a prehire physical examination administered by a nurse, no limitation was found that infringed on her ability to do the job. The Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals (MHRH) refused to hire her because her obesity was a health risk to herself and she might put retarded residents at risk in emergency situations because of her limited mobility.
The agency was also concerned over possible absenteeism and costs of workers' compensation injuries that could occur because of her obesity. Ms. Cook sued RIMHRH under the Rehabilitation Act.] SELYA, C. J.... At the times material hereto, defendant-appellant Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals (MHRH), a subdivision of the Rhode Island state government, operated the Ladd Center as a residential facility for retarded persons. Plaintiffappellee Bonnie Cook worked at Ladd as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded from 1978 to 1980, and again from 1981 to 1986. Both times she departed voluntarily, leaving behind a spotless work record. The defendant concedes that Cook's past performance met its legitimate expectations.
In 1988, when plaintiff reapplied for the identical position, she stood 50 200 tall and weighed over 320 pounds. During the routine pre-hire physical, a nurse employed by MHRH concluded that plaintiff was morbidly obese but found no limitations that impinged upon her ability to do the job. Notwithstanding that plaintiff passed the physical examination, MHRH balked. It claimed that Cook's morbid obesity compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of an emergency and put her at greater risk of developing serious ailments (a "fact" that MHRH's hierarchs speculated would promote absenteeism and increase the likelihood of workers' compensation claims).
Consequently, MHRH refused to hire plaintiff for a vacant IA-MR position. Cook did not go quietly into this dark night. Invoking section 504, she sued MHRH in federal district court.... In due season, the parties tried the case to a jury. At the close of the evidence, appellant moved for judgment as a matter of law. The court reserved decision, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), and submitted the case on special interrogatories (to which appellant interposed no objections). The jury answered the interrogatories favorably to plaintiff and, by means of the accompanying general verdict, awarded her $100,000 in compensatory damages.
The district court denied appellant's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, entered judgment on the verdict, and granted equitable relief to the plaintiff. MHRH lost little time in filing a notice of appeal. In handicap discrimination cases brought pursuant to federal law, the claimant bears the burden of proving each element of her [claim]. The elements derive from section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which provides in relevant part: "[n]o otherwise qualified individual ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, ... be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." ... To invoke the statute in a failureto-hire case, a claimant must prove four things:
(1) that she applied for a post in a federally funded program or activity,
(2) that, at the time, she suffered from a cognizable disability,
(3) but was, nonetheless, qualified for the position, and
(4) that she was not hired due solely to her disability. Here, MHRH concedes that it received substantial federal funding for the operation of the Ladd Center... Appellant counterattacks on two fronts. Neither foray succeeds.
1. Mutability. MHRH baldly asserts that "mutable" conditions are not the sort of impairments that can find safe harbor in the lee of section 504. It exacuates this assertion by claiming that morbid obesity is a mutable condition and that, therefore, one who suffers from it is not handicapped within the meaning of the federal law because she can simply lose weight and rid herself of any concomitant disability.
This suggestion is as insubstantial as a pitchman's promise... In deciding this issue, the jury had before it credible evidence that metabolic dysfunction, which leads to weight gain in the morbidly obese, lingers even after weight loss. Given this evidence, the jury reasonably could have found that, though people afflicted with morbid obesity can treat the manifestations of metabolic dysfunction by fasting or perennial undereating, the physical impairment itself-a dysfunctional metabolism-is permanent. Cf. Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 641 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that kidney disease controllable by weekly dialysis constitutes a handicap under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that epilepsy controllable by medication qualifies as a handicap under § 504).
Hence, the jury's resolution of the mutability question rested on a sufficiently sturdy evidentiary platform... ... MHRH asseverates that, because morbid obesity is caused, or at least exacerbated, by voluntary conduct, it cannot constitute an impairment falling within the ambit of section 504. But, this asseveration rests on a legally faulty premise. The Rehabilitation Act contains no language suggesting that its protection is linked to how an individual became impaired, or whether an individual contributed to his or her impairment.
On the contrary, the Act indisputably applies to numerous conditions that may be caused or exacerbated by voluntary conduct, such as alcoholism, AIDS, diabetes, cancer resulting from cigarette smoking, heart disease resulting from excesses of various types, and the like... Consequently, voluntariness, like mutability, is relevant only in determining whether a condition has a substantially limiting effect. Appellant's premise fares no better as a matter of fact. The instructions (to which appellant did not object) specifically restricted disabilities to those conditions "that the person affected is powerless to control." Given the plethoric evidence introduced concerning the physiological roots of morbid obesity, the jury certainly could have concluded that the metabolic dysfunction and failed appetite-suppressing neural signals were beyond plaintiff's control and rendered her effectively powerless to manage her weight. ... The next stop on our odyssey requires us to consider whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" to work as an IA-MR. Once again, an affirmative answer emerges. "An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of h[er] handicap."
Although an employer is not required to be unfailingly correct in assessing a person's qualifications for a job, an employer cannot act solely on the basis of subjective beliefs. An unfounded assumption that an applicant is unqualified for a particular job, even if arrived at in good faith, is not sufficient to forestall liability under section 504.... Appellant's position, insofar as we can understand it, is that plaintiff's morbid obesity presented such a risk to herself and the Ladd Center's residents that she was not otherwise qualified, or, in the alternative, that it was reasonable for appellant to believe that she was not otherwise qualified. This protestation is undone by ... independent considerations.... We will not paint the lily. Several pieces of evidence loom large on this issue.
Plaintiff received a satisfactory report following the physical examination conducted by appellant's own nurse; the IA-MR position for which she applied did not demand any elevated level of mobility, lifting ability, size, or stature; plaintiff had satisfactorily performed all her duties and responsibilities as an IA-MR during her previous five years of employment; and MHRH acknowledged that those duties and responsibilities have not changed. From this, and other, evidence, we believe that the jury lawfully could have found plaintiff, apart from any impairment, "otherwise qualified" to work as an IA-MR.
Our last port of call requires that we determine whether the evidence justified a finding that MHRH turned down plaintiff's request for employment due solely to her morbid obesity. This final piece of the puzzle is straightforward. MHRH has not offered a hint of any nonweight-related reason for rejecting plaintiff's application. Rather, it has consistently conceded that it gave plaintiff the cold shoulder because Dr. O'Brien denied her medical clearance. The record is pellucid that Dr. O'Brien's refusal had three foci, each of which related directly to plaintiff's obesity.
On this record, there was considerable room for a jury to find that appellant declined to hire Cook "due solely to" her perceived handicap. Conclusion We need go no further. In a society that all too often confuses "slim" with "beautiful" or "good," morbid obesity can present formidable barriers to employment. Where, as here, the barriers transgress federal law, those who erect and seek to preserve them must suffer the consequences. In this case, the evidence adduced at trial amply supports the jury's determination that MHRH violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. And because MHRH refused to hire plaintiff due solely to her morbid obesity, there is no cause to disturb either the damage award or the equitable relief granted by the district court. Affirmed.
Case Questions
1. Are extremely overweight individuals protected under the Rehabilitation Act from discrimination based on their morbid obesity?
2. Can a person be considered as having a disability and thus be eligible for the protections of the Act when that individual can rid herself of the "disability" by simply losing weight?
3. Assess the judge's remarks in the first three sentences of the conclusion of the decision.