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Resolving principal-agent problems

I have a problem in economics on Resolving principal-agent problems. Please help me in the following question. Attempts to resolve the principal-agent problems among stockholders and top corporate managers (that is, CEOs) comprise: (i) Profit-sharing systems for the top corporate managers. (ii) Programs to contain low-level workers monitor one other. (iii) Recent federal legislation which limits the terms of office of the corporate CEOs. (iv) Boards of Directors setting extremely high base wages for the corporate CEOs.

What is the most precise answer?

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