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Problem on Nash equilibrium

In a project, employee and boss are working altogether. The employee can be sincere or insincere, and the Boss can either reward or penalize. The employee gets no benefit for being sincere but gets utility for being insincere (30), for getting rewarded (10) and for being penalized (-30). The Boss gets utility from seeing sincere (20) or insincere (-10) behavior. They also get utility for giving rewards and by penalizing, but the size of the utility change depends on whether the reward obeys sincere (20) or insincere (10)  work. Likewise the size of the utility change depends on whether the penalty obeys sincere (-10) or insincere (0) behavior.

a) Determine the Nash equilibrium making use of the extensive form and.
b) Recommend,what could the Boss do to enhance the end result?

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