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Pig Game

Using the PairOfDice class design and implement a class to play a game called Pig. In this game the user competes against the computer. On each turn the player rolls a pair of dice and adds up his or her points. Whoever reaches 100 points first, wins. If a player rolls a 1, he or she loses all points for that round and the die go to the other player. If a player rolls two 1s in one turn, the player loses all points earned so far in the game and loses control of the dice. The player may voluntarily turn over the dice after each roll. So the player must decide to either roll again and risk losing points, or give up the dice possibly letting the other player win.

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