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Attributable worth cultivating

The theory which the economic rent on agricultural land depends upon how much extra production is gained relative to the production which could be realized on land not rather worth cultivating is attributable to: (1) Johann H. von Thünen. (2) Adam Smith. (3) Richard Cantillon. (4) David Ricardo. (5) Reverent Thomas Robert (“Bob”) Malthus.

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